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6.3.1. Subnational conflicts.

Subnational conflicts are divided according to participate in the religious factor. On the NC has only one nation with the carriers of Orthodoxy and Islam it is the Ossetians, so only they have intra-religious conflicts. Today, the largest number of intra-national conflicts, the so-called "calling card" of the NC, it is necessary for intra-conflict (traditional and radical Islam). These conflicts can be in all the republics. Only in Dagestan, there is one more form of intra-conflict - between Sunnis and Shiites (the majority Lezgins).

Chechnya and Ingushetia due to a number of factors contributes only a characteristic of the day they form intra-conflict that is not associated with religion - among teyp.

Mezhteypovye (interteyps) contradictions.

During the Soviet period in the Chechen Republic in one degree or another various options for modernizing the political system were made, which included various combinations of elements of Western democracy, an Islamic theocracy, the traditional tribal and ethnic and religious organizations of the national community (teypovo tukhamnye-and-virdovo tarikatnye structure). By the combination of objective conditions and subjective factors, none of these options would not be successful.
In the analysis vnutrichechenskih, vnutriingushskih conflict must take into account this fundamental fact of fundamental political importance. These people fairly concentrated, but a form of consolidation (especially given the existing regression) contains the elements identified in the feudal, tribal, clannish nature. This is so-called "traditional society in the stage of initial accumulation of capital." The criminal nature of such accumulation creates a complex symbiosis of the traditional with the criminal, often not even aware of as a criminal. This is typical for many peoples of NC, preserving the feudal and pre-feudal tradition and the "absorbent bourgeois spirit" in very specific ways. The one leading specialists in Oriental Malashenko explains the situation "Chechens have their lives and thoughts, their ideas about standards of conduct, their own faith". In Chechnya, there was a specific system of social organization, called by the ethnologist J. Chesnova "Vainakh democracy".

Since the end 1980s, local social scientists and advocates have to make major adjustments to the historical myth and the modern Chechen identity. And the elite public version first differed little from that generally accepted, but it quickly becomes subject to politics and emotions. In constructing a new "Chechen" two opposite settings compete. One is to include in a number of Chechen as much as possible groups to enhance the cultural power and geographical space of this nation. The other, born of the modern competition for the privatized resources and masterful control, is intensifying and the invention of new group coalitions are usually based on regional-clan (kinship) connection.

Interest to the teyp organization always amplified in periods of transition. It was characteristic for the 90-ies of XX century. Neoteypizm was not so much a "rebirth" or enhancing of the importance of traditional social institutions, as, above all, modern and contemporary mobilization of the construction of new differences. "Suddenly everyone started asking each other, and what teip are you from?"

The congresses of many tapes have been held, heads and governing bodies were elected, a program of action was elaborated, but without a real ground, neither the socio-economic, nor political, this process is gradually extinguished. Besides Vainakh society in this period has represented a more or less stable social structure (the post-Soviet) which elements have certain economic and political interests not burdened by teyp’s ideology.

Certain element of absolute traditions Vainakh military democracy in explaining the high degree of mobilization of Chechens in the conflict there and in the assessments leading expert on Caucasus Sergei Arutyunov, "The processes that we face, in fact, are far more profound nature. In the region full revival dozing until the time the early feudal and predfeodalny forms started".

In the course of military campaigns teip division also presented. In each village is mainly concentrated several teips. Battle groups united by a territorial aspect, but teyp aspect had not the last place too. In Yermolovka, for example, during the war was Galaichozhskaya team, comprising teip Galai. In Zakan-Yurt Chaberloevsky commandos led by Kurd Bazhievym acted, this is also the basis of teip Chaberloy.

Category of teip became very popular in analytical work on the problem vnutrivaynahskih conflicts. The majority of Russian researchers identify the genus or teip name, making this conclusion based on the tribal structure of society Vainakh. Some Russian politicians, after the orthodox-minded Chechens and Ingush, even offer to elect a teip parliament and teip government as a guarantor of stability in both countries.

Instability in modern Chechnya and Ingushetia today is largely due to the lack of formalized social structure. In these circumstances, it might seem logical to attempt to use teip stratification as a stabilizing factor and a social basis for the construction of the state system, which is supposedly national in essence and form, "If we can speak about some kind of stable social groups with common economic and political interests, it is only about family and kinship clans. Typologically Vainakh society can be compared with the classic rural community. Although representatives of the same teip often seen "on the opposite front line", yet even in the policy (central and local) sometimes it made to operate with such concepts as teyp brotherhood, teip solidarity”.
For in-depth analysis unit of the Chechen society must know the basic teips laws

- Teip held (-s) a defined territory and had (has) its teyp mount, owned by teip (contains-) and teip tower, built by their ancestor, teip had (has) its separate teyp cemetery;

- An announcement by all teips vendetta for the killing of another teip and public defamation of a member teip;

- The absolute prohibition of marriage between members of teip;
- Providing to individual members teip assistance in case of disaster or misfortune;

- In case of death of a member of teip - The announcement of mourning all the tapes, strict abstinence from participation in amusements;

- Teips were directed ( is directed), by the leader of teip (taypanan halhancha), who heads a council of elders, the choice of leader, produced a council of elders, not wearing a hereditary nature, each teip had

(has) a council of elders, etc.

You can highlight the reasons for the expansion and extinction of teip it as a real social category. An increase of internal contradictions and inconsistency of teip as a social institution to new socio-economic realities:
- No need to organize social teip functions with the emergence of public institutions;
- Violation of the same teip territory;

- Lack of common economic and political interests among different social groups and patronymic teip in connection with violation of the principle of territorial unity.

Politics of teips opposition to each other due to religious and fighting among the teips releases a large number of radicals who are ready to do any work for appropriate remuneration. For example, historically the Mountain teips are considered more "prestigious" than the plain . The division of the Chechens on the "mountain" and "plaint" is preserved even in jokes: "Two brothers and their families moved from the mountains to the plains, and one of them, the first moving the border bridge and felt plain Chechen, the other shouts:" Hey, Lamoreaux (mountain , backward, savage), how are you? ".

Furthermore, among the inhabitants of the mountain regions there are more radical nationalists, because they suffered more as the imperial and the Soviet era. They had been deported twice, in 1944 and in 1957, at the same time it is the poorest of the population. In the 90s it was mostly mountainous teips supported the idea of independence of Ichkeria, they were the basis of dzhaharov’s army. The opposition was based on the plain tapes, but much of Representatives, was less militant, and would prefer to wait. With the start of hostilities almost all mountain tapes took an active part, some of them after the second campaign did not lay down their arms, and some of them even began to move into a mountain to Georgia (with the advent of Ramzan Kadyrov).

Thus, despite the fact that most major teips (except teip Benoy) in one form or another until the outbreak of hostilities were opposed to J. Dudayev, last a long time was able to balance this opposition by incitement of religious differentiation among teips. In addition, the first leader of the Vainakh Democratic Party vice-president of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, has done much to oppose themselves to each other and teips although suspicions and accusations of "teypovschine" remain, he publicly stated that the members of his government there is no native of native teip.

The role of religion in social and political mobilization of Chechens fairly palpable. Even with today's rather authoritarian policy of the republic's head, the descendants of the sheikhs or virdovye authorities have a lot of weight in Chechen society. So often these or other political figures (the president's relatives) in political campaigns or during elections at various levels often turn to the religious authorities with a request to mobilize their "flock" to their support. Virdovye leaders also play a key role in reconciling the warring parties, especially krovnikov.

Based on the foregoing, be concluded that any attempt to artificially restore or institutions, or the law that existed at teypovo tukhumnoy-organization, to the modern state system will cause great damage to the construction and modernization of the republic, will return in the distant past, regression in social and historical evolution Chechen and Ingush nations. Until now, the mobilization of people and cementation occurred only when brushed against the global interests and ethnic group arose external threats to its existence.

At the present stage of development of Chechnya and Ingushetia, tribal and ethnic religious structures as the basic elements of the traditional organization of society, manifest themselves differentially in the socio-political life: as part of official government institutions of conflict, regardless of which political formation the latter is currently presented; in part - by promoting the official power structures. In this case, referring to the affiliation to the different genera and wyrd of representatives of power formations, we should state their kind of division within ourselves, and not opposed to each other, as evidenced by the fact that none teip or wyrd did not take and had not taken before any whole sides in the protracted confrontation.

Interfaith (intra-national) conflict

Interfaith (intra-national) conflict in the NC is only possible with the Ossetians. However, almost five centuries, there were no any significant conflict between faiths. The Ossetians are composed of three sub-ethnic groups: irontsev (Christians) digortsev (Sunni Muslim) and husarov or kudartsev (Christians) living in South Ossetia.

For Ossetian Muslims socio-political issues have always been more important religious and national (regional) identity is more important than Muslim. It should be noted that their religious affiliation, not playing a significant role for themselves digortsev served as the main distinguishing feature, which could be based dislike of Christian communities. On the basis of the formation of national identity of these people there were strong tribal ties. Religion could not play a strong role there, if only because the Ossetians were divided into three religious communities (paganism, Christianity, Islam). This structure of society allowed Ossetians to save the community connections and cultural traditions and continuity was based on a commonality of "by blood", typical of patriarchal groups.

Intra (vneetnicheskie) conflicts

These conflicts are in each country, but also have features, especially the representatives of the warring groups:

- Radical views (religious and nationalist) and criminality;

- The official religious and national organizations, law enforcement, government (bureaucrats). The official clergy clearly sided with the government and security officials.

The first, and as many at the Center think, the most important of the guilt of destabilization in the

NC are the various adherents of extremist views. At all levels of government, both local and central, to talk about the need for complete destruction of data members.
They have a variety of names: the militants, terrorists (Islamic), the Wahhabis (Salafis), the fundamentalists, the forest brothers, partisans, Jadida, representatives of the Jamaat, nationalists, separatists, the warriors of the Caucasus Imamate, naibs, murids etc. Surprisingly but these numerous representatives of the North Society also have multiple differences between themselves and sometimes great.

Traditional nationalists (separatists and ethnoradikals) in the NC, with amendment on the psychology of people, not much different from similar people in other states. Typical internal motivation is "ethnic republic of one nation." But the most noteworthy are the same religious radicals, as they smoothly and steadily gaining speed in the future, having all the prerequisites, will present itself as a monolithic force.

The NC by the factor of "intra-conflict" can be divided into two zones: Eastern (Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) and western (Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Adygea). As seen from the division, this factor is not only pointing to the conditional alarming and not disturbing areas (the number of high-profile crimes in recent times), but also on religion (fundamental, orthodox, radical) the Peoples of data Republics.

Murders of law enforcement agencies and authorities are already familiar background, but the assassination and murder of priests (the official) said yet about religion as a territory of power and influence. For example, some imams of regions of Dagestan openly declare that they are faced with a choice - to remain faithful to their faith (tarikatizma) and thus expose the deadly danger of his life or do Salafi propaganda. Between the fundamentalists and traditionalists, there are no fundamental contradictions in terms of Islam itself. And they both recognize the five pillars of Islam without unconditionally that those and other does Muslims.

To some extent inerislam conflict this is a conflict between fathers and sons. Sons tried to defend their new point of view of Islam, they name as (the Wahhabis, the rebels, devils), they also came up in response to several scathing names for their fathers, most of which are harmless - "ethnic" Muslims, i.e., Muslim by birth, but not by faith. The most offensive characteristic of the "ethnic" of Islam, which happened to hear is a "death-Islam" (because of the worship of saints and read verses from the Quran in the cemetery). According to the youth, the Muslim religion should be free of innovation, delusions (ethnic traditions, customs).

As well as intra-option conflict should be considered a conflict between supporters of the two directions of traditional Islam's Sunnis and Shiites. Attitude towards Shiism in Sunni is negative, but because of densely populated Shiite enclave in the only (Dagestan) and hiding his own Shiite religious affiliation practical manifestations of xenophobia still not observed. However, you need to know the main differences between Sunnis and Shiites, since this is the intra-konflit ubiquitous in the Islamic world (Iran, Iraq, intra-war, etc.). Major world center of Shiism is Iran.

The discrepancy between Sunnis and Shiites is only in minor details: the Shia recognize the authority of the Prophet's family, while the Sunnis revere and more evidence of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad.

In the collections of the Sunni tradition (hadith) and Shia traditions (Akhbar) most of the texts are general and vary isnaad and Musnad on behalf of those who told them. In marriage law Shiism recognizes institute of temporary marriage, the Sunnis have not a temporary marriage. Such a marriage existed in Arabia before the rise of Islam, and in its early Muhammad treated tolerantly to him.

The Shiites do not recognize the religious authority of the first three caliphs - Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman. In the eyes of the Shia Ali (Muhammad's cousin and his son - the husband of Fatima, the Prophet's daughter), and twelve of his direct descendants - the original caliphs (imams). By Shia of Ali and his descendants the hereditary principle represent the sovereignty and the principle of prophecy. In the Sunni imam is a spiritual and temporal head of the Muslims, who are elected or appointed people, while Shiite imam becomes so by virtue of divine guidance.
The most numerous on the number of followers and liberal Shia Imami is dzha'faritsko-madhhab - isnaashari, i.e. followers of the twelve imams - direct descendants of 'Ali. In Islam, the prayer ritual is a common call - azan - the faithful to prayer. In the Shi'a call to prayer, there is an additional sentence after the words "No God but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah," added the Shiites' Alian-Wali Ullah".

Shiites as Sunnis go to the hajj - the pilgrimage to Mecca and received, like all Muslims, the title of Haji. But the Shiites still have their own holy places - the tomb of Imam Hussein in Kerbala (in Iraq), the tomb of one of the descendants of Ali Imam Reza in Mashhad (Iran). Visiting these places, the Shiites received the title and Karbalayi Meshedi.

The first conflict in the Muslim community occurred (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) due to internal conflicts, ideological and political nature. After nearly 20 years of division, in which the Muslims of Russia have been under the control of several spiritual centers, their leaders began to unite. The idea of creating a unified Muslim center is supported by the secular authorities. Thus, one of its most ardent supporters is the president of Chechnya, it is possible that the very center (whether consciously or not) interested in the unification process.

Although the situation in the various republics of the NC noticeably different, but we can identify common factors (Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia)

official government opposes scattered armed underground; radicals are less likely to put up against "security officials" sufficiently large group, but retained the use of suicide (not specific to cultural and psychological characteristics of the NC) is not considered a major threat to the hostage-taking and loss of control of the region in an attack by large Force fighters, "Chechenization" of the conflict gave a noticeable effect in the fight against armed resistance in the past;

radicals attack mostly police officers, to position themselves not as terrorists but as insurgents who attack only the pro-Russian goal of actively exploited the antagonism between morality "police officer" and "mujahid". If the first image in the public mind tightly linked to corruption, lack of principle, and "subservience" to Russian, the second figure is presented as a virtuous, righteous and just.

power structures, in turn, firmly respond to an attack, not too much paying attention to the position of the population and to periodically carry out a policy of state terror: his father's son, sister's brother, etc. (Especially in Chechnya). Number of abductions is increased. Many of the kidnapped men belong to the families of the Salafis. From the words of local residents who were abducted are killed, often concealing the murder for the death during a firefight. In addition, law enforcement agencies are actively using measures such as: burning of houses of Salafis, prohibitions hold a wake for slain militants and bury them in cemeteries, as well as the practice of continuous pressure and moral, and often physical, not only to close family member of the armed underground, but also to their friends and acquaintances.

Chechen president ever publicly stated that they would be destroyed - do not linger, but destroyed - people who profess a certain trend in Islam, and even those for which there is the slightest suspicion ("the smell of Wahhabism"). He threatened the relatives of those who left to the rebels: "Over the next sortie and attack the militants responsibility will rest with the family and close members of thugs: “ For any event, a crime that will create these devils, will meet his father, mother, brother, sister. "

through its operations, the radicals do not pay attention to civilian casualties. In such cases, they blame the victim for the very civilians who, while living near the attack sites, allegedly became indirect associates of the Russian authorities, the violence is becoming more widespread, carried out openly and defiantly.

also continue to cleanup, among the "sinful" people (the fortune-teller, businesses that sell alcohol, women of easy virtue). Treatment to warn the Mujahedeen principals and teachers appear. They are threatened with death for anti-Islamic propaganda and anti-Islamic actions: the ban of the hijab at school, placing both boys and girls at the same desk, etc.

there is the increasing use of the Internet, and judging by the extensive forums and radical sites are very popular;

uniformed pay any tragedy in their favor, arguing that the disaster happened because insufficient effort, not funded, not strengthened their ranks;

they  remain  contradictions  between  the  supporters  of  "traditional"  for  the  NC  Islam,  and relatively new to the region the fundamentalist Salafi (Wahhabi) movement of Islam until the clashes, the radicals refused to national liberation themes in propaganda, totally going to the religious and ethical subjects; it became the rule, when the relatives of killed or wounded in a shootout with security forces by militants trying not to make that fact public. This is such an informal form of silencing what had happened,

because people are afraid of blood vengeance. Because of relatives not only killed policemen, but the militants. And they both try to hide the death of a close in a shootout, if it’s possible. In the Caucasus, there were many cases where the vendetta was accomplished even half a century, and even more, "A man does not serve his whole life in policy, sooner or later he or retires, or goes to another job, then everything can happen.


Speaking of intra-conflict in Dagestan, then we will tell, first of all, the intra-, and then inter-ethnic conflicts. Dagestan is the most Islamized region not only in the NC but also the whole of Russia. It is believed that on the land of the Dagestan Islam was first introduced and then later spread to all other peoples of the NC. Consolidation of Islamic ideology among the peoples of Daghestan took no less than nine centuries. Islam in the republic was, as elsewhere in Russia, the most politicized and a considerable number of local religious organizations have the status nationwide. In the context of the politicization of Islam it is more and more difficult and even dangerous not only write but also to talk about it.

The most protracted and sharp is the conflict between different factions of the Muslim religious ministers and religious groups in Dagestan. Here to the antagonism of the traditionalists (represented by the followers of the Sufi tarikats three) and fundamentalist added the contradictions between religious leaders, representing also different ethnic groups. All this greatly radicalizes traditionalism, causing a growing perception of the carriers of this type of religious consciousness of Salafi set of values. For example, according to a DNC in 2004 under the leadership of the RAS Daghestan reputable scientist Z.M. Abdulagatova, case studies, 83% of the ministers of the Islamic cult and up to 40% of believers in the country today adhere to fundamentalist views.

Ethno-religious map of Dagestan. The great part of the population adheres to Sunni areas: the Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, tabasarantsy, Aguls, Tsakhurs, Chechens, Azerbaijanis and part of the Nogai. Most of them adhere to the Shafi school of thought - even set in the deep past of the complex religious and legal doctrine and ritual practices. Nogai and Kumyk part Babayurtovsky area have a different school of thought - Hanafi. Shiite Islam is practiced in most areas of Azerbaijanis, residing mainly in Derbent and Derbent region, in Makhachkala and Kizlyar, as well as residents of one village Lezghian Miskindzhi Dokusparinsky area. Salafis are found in virtually all ethnic groups in Dagestan. For this reason, the conflict between the Salafis and tarikatists does not carry any ethnic component.

Background of conflict. It is believed that the conflict between the Salafis and tarikatists in the NC was largely inspired from abroad. Of course, is impossible to deny the influence of foreign Islamic centers and foundations for the growth of radical Islamic sentiment, but the ground for their impact was more than gracious.

In early 1989, riots occurred in Buinaksk in deciding who would be the new head of the city mosque, similar conflicts have occurred in several other localities. Conflicts in the spontaneous establishment of new mosques were the beginning of an extensive process that continues to this day. Still, the bloodshed in the process brought Salafism.

For the subsequent analysis and conclusions how to work with Salafism, it is necessary to trace the chain of events in Dagestan, it all began. The first conflict between the traditionalists and the Salafis were

reported in 1990 occurred in 1992, split of DUM into small national muftiats dramatically weakened the traditional Muslims and allowed Salafites pursue their activities unhindered. Their aggressive methods, condemnation of centuries-old customs and rituals led to armed clashes with the traditionalists, who in 1991-1995 were noted in Kizilyurt and Kazbek areas, as well as most of Makhachkala.

The main obstacle of expansion of Salafis in Dagestan was reviving the Sufi movement, represented with Tariqa shaziliyya, nashkbandiyya and kadariyya. In 1996, the main battleground between the Salafis and tarikatist became the so-called Kadar zone, which included the village of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar Buinaksk district of the republic. In May 1997 in the village Chabanmakhi there was the first large-scale conflict between the Salafis and tarikatists, two residents of the village were killed. The conflict sparked a rally of tarikatists, demanding the expulsion from the village Salafists as creating "an intolerable situation ... in relation to persons professing the normal direction of Islam."

By the spring of 1998 Salafis have completed the process of seizing power in the Kadar zone, effectively forming within it Sharia mini-state. Financial support was provided by Kadar Jamaat Arab funds and organized crime groups, while Chechen fighters supplied them with arms. August 16 Kadar zone was declared "separate Islamic territory", living under Sharia law, and not subordinating to the Russian authorities. August 21, in an act of terrorism DUM chairman was killed.

August 6, 1999 the gangs of Chechen field commanders have crossed the border of Dagestan and seized several villages in the Botlikh district of the republic. Salafis Kadar enclave came into the fighting on the side of the Chechens. After months of fighting, the militants were driven from the territory of Dagestan, and Kadar village enclave exempt from the Salafis.

Since then, authorities in Dagestan in conjunction with Muslim religious leaders began a full-scale campaign to eradicate in the Republic of radical Islam, being able in a short time to regain control over the situation in the religious sphere. All suspected of sympathizing with the Salafi were put on record in law enforcement, and suspicious of the community are closed. September 16, 1999 at a session of the Dagestani parliament, it was announced on the Prohibition of Wahhabism in Dagestan. Since then the movement has been operating in secret, but it is not severely restricts it in recruiting.

In our time, activity became more Salafists and the exact spot. Here are just some of the cases for 2006-2009.:

- July 2006. Makhachkala. An attempt on the village imam of Shamkhal.
- February 2007. Makhachkala. Killed imam of a mosque in Makhachkala (in the mosque) was
- June 2007. Car of deputy mufti of Dagestan was blown, he and his brother, were killed.

- September 2007. Karabudahkensky area. A minister from the mosque of village Gubden was killed. (the holy month of Ramadan)

- May 2009. Makhachkala. Killed deputy mufti of Dagestan (two shots to the head), distinguished by a singular intransigence towards Salafism. According to the mayor Amirov there no interethnic problems in Dagestan: "In the forests there are all 16 nationalities. The problem is fragmentation of the Muslims" . And human rights activists and journalists, and military claim that one of the main reasons for the split is the activity of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Dagestan (DUMD). Spiritual Directorate, which is called the "Ministry of Truth", the "reincarnation of the Holy Inquisition," is a public organization and should unite all Muslims. "Once in the village, I went to see the madrassa, what does imam teach children? He has four sons, all in private secular colleges, Makhachkala, and it costs a lot of money. He does not clog their brains. I then spoke to local residents who send their children to school instead of a madrassa, told them that they did not listen to this crook - outraged colonel Ismailov. - Or 10 years ago it was the fashion to send their children to study in Arab universities. What will they be tought there?"Siloviki argue that many university graduates of Cairo, Bukhara, Damascus, returning home, led radical Islamic circles.

Human rights activists put forward other charges, "The leadership of DUMD - as they say is corrupt and all dissenters imams sit to militiamen who kill them as militants. Among other dissidents there are sometimes influential in Dagestan spiritual leaders - the sheikhs, whose murids (students) eventually go underground, not wishing to obey the central religious authority. If you go to any bookstore, the scope of work of DUMD is obvious: every book on religious themes is accompanied by a signature stamp "Approved by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Dagestan."

In DUMD these allegations are refuted. The sign "Approved," according to the spokesperson of the management Magomedrasul Omarova is purely advisory nature and it was decided to put in the interests of booksellers: "That law enforcement have no the claims to them, suspicious any religious literature. DUMD did not give areas of study abroad at any one person longer. Pressure on dissenters, according the head of the press-service of DUMD, really could be provided before, but over last 6-7 years the practice has been eradicated. As for cooperation with the MIA, squealing it is certainly a shame. DUMD it decries - Omarov said in an interview with The New Times. - It is easier to work with a buffalo than with our Ministry of Interior. " Omarov argues that ideological fighters in the mountains, there is almost no "Gone, not because of religious differences, but because of social disorder".

Common misconception about the causes of the Center of recruiting new members Salafis, such as - the total lack of education and ignorance of traditional Islam, not quite correspond to reality. It should be noted that the extremist underground, as there are active participants and members of the Muslim intelligentsia, students, graduate students, scientists, etc. For example, Abuzagir Mantaev, one of killed October 9, 2005 in Makhachkala, the so-called militant of Jamaat "Shariat" in 2002 in Moscow, defended his Ph.D. degree in Political Science on "Wahhabism and political situation in Dagestan". For a time he worked in the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of European part of Russia. In 2005 he returned to Dagestan and joined the ranks of "Sharia". And there are a lot of such examples in the republics of the NC.
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